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1. Introduction
The principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU
is the legal basis used by EU courts to clarify the duties of national courts and
administrative authorities in Member States when applying EU law1 to ensure
that it is applied uniformly on a national level.2 The duty of national courts and
administrative authorities to apply national law in line with EU law therefore
seems to be clear, at least at first sight. There is however uncertainty when
judges or public servants are faced with non-legally binding EU law, commonly
called ‘soft law’,3 such as recommendations and opinions.4
In its Grimaldi judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(hereinafter ‘CJEU’) ruled that national courts are bound to take recommenda-
tions – a category of soft law instruments – ‘into consideration in order to decide
disputes submitted to them.’5 Although the Court was silent on whether such
an obligation stemmed from Article 4(3) TEU, commentators argue that the
principle of sincere cooperation is the general principle of EU law underlying
DOI 10.7590/187479818X15282881229829 1874-7981 2018 Review of European Administrative
Law
*
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C-202/1, art 4(3).1
John Temple Lang, ‘The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of
National Authorities and Community Institution under Article 10 EC’ (2008) 31 Fordham Int’l
LJ 1483, 1483f.
2
Francis Snyder, ‘Soft law and institutional practice in the European Community’, in: Stephen
Martin (ed.), The construction of Europe (Springer 1994), 197.
3
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ4
C-202/1, art 288.
Case C-322/88, Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles [1989]5
ECLI:EU:C:1989:646, para. 18.
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this obligation.6 Article 288 TFEU is clear in that at least two soft law instru-
ments (recommendations and opinions) have no legally binding force;7 never-
theless, there is little further guidance on an EU level what other, if any, effects
soft law does have. This is because, firstly, treaties are silent beyond what is
stated in Article 288 TFEU. Secondly, considering that the Grimaldi saga began
in 1989 – 5 years after the Court’s Von Colson judgment8 – the Court had ample
opportunities to clarify the nature of the obligation on national courts and au-
thorities to take soft law into consideration, but has never made use of them.
Therefore, although the CJEU has settled that EU soft law instruments in
principle have no ‘legal effects,’ i.e. they do not have legally binding force, it
remains unclear whether such instruments can produce ‘practical effects,’ i.e.
those which induce changes in the behaviour and practices of the instrument’s
addressees and third parties.9
One would think that the reason lies in the small relevance of soft law in
practice. However, the complete opposite is true: soft law is now widely used
in most of the EU’s policy areas10 and it is unthinkable for businesses to ignore
the Commission’s Guidelines and Notices and believe they do not affect them.11
Lawyers constantly use such documents to aid them with interpreting vague
Treaty provisions.12 To that end, do national courts and authorities also value
soft law and use it in cases before them? If there is no clear consistency obliga-
tion under EU law with regard to soft law, do bodies in different jurisdictions
use it differently? What if, on the other hand, soft law is relied on by businesses
and accepted uniformly by different courts and authorities? Does it then not
have practical effects that bring soft law close to possessing legal effects of
democratically introduced EU legislation? Does this not infringe the rule of
law? This type of questions is addressed in the current debate on soft law.13
Emilia Korkea-Aho, ‘National adjudication and transnational soft law: Is Grimaldi still good
law?’, Yearbook of European Law (2018) (forthcoming), ft 6.
6
TFEU, art 288.7
Oana Stefan, ‘European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Principles?’
(2008) 14(6) European Law Journal 753, 767f; Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann
v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECLI:EU:C:1984:153.
8
Case C-16/16 P, Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:79, Opinion
of AG Bobek, para. 88. Note, also, that what the authors refer to as ‘legal effects’ and ‘practical
9
effects’ is referred to in CJEU jurisprudence as, respectively, ‘binding legal effects’ and ‘legal
effects’.
Daniel Wincott, ‘Looking Forward or Harking Back? The Commission and the Reform of
Governance in the European Union’ (2001), 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 897, 899-
901.
10
With regard to competition law, see: Håkon A. Cosma and Richard Whish, ‘Soft Law in the
Field of EU Competition Policy’ (2003) 14(1) EBLR 25, 31.
11
Arts 101 and 102 TFEU are examples in the field of competition law; Cosma (n 11), 31.12
For arguments for and against soft law, see: Cosma (n 11), 32ff.13
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Prior research has focused mainly on the use of EU soft law by the EU Courts
and, to a lesser extent, on the use of EU soft law by national courts. Empirical
studies of cases decided by the CJEU have shown that EU soft law does not
have legally binding force and is considered to be an interpretation aid more
than anything else. However, it may have legally binding effects when it is
published by an EU institution that thereby limits its discretion, or when soft
law amounts to individual decisions that create specific legitimate expectations.14
Relevant case law has shown that general principles of law, as found in the
Treaties, give soft law its, albeit limited, legal effects.15 Some research has also
been conducted on the use of EU competition soft law by national courts in the
UK, Netherlands,16 France and Germany,17 according to which courts do, in
principle, apply EU soft law instruments.
Ambiguity regarding the effects of soft law is even larger for national admin-
istrative authorities, since, despite falling within the scope of the sincere cooper-
ation obligation,18 the Grimaldi judgment only applies to national courts. A field
that thus merits close attention is EU competition soft law. Firstly, since the
adoption of Regulation 1/2003,19 National Competition Authorities (hereinafter
‘NCAs’) have the power to apply and enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU them-
selves. Secondly, more and more competition cases are enforced by NCAs with
the development of the European Competition Network. Thirdly, if before the
Regulation 1/2003 the Commission had the sole enforcement power but was
nevertheless legally bound by the soft law it issued,20 NCAs now enforce com-
petition law without such a legal obligation. This causes uncertainty to busi-
nesses that must ensure their compliance with EU competition law and thereby
makes the ambiguity surrounding the use of EU soft law by NCAs especially
problematic.
To address this issue, this article chooses to use the UK Competition and
Markets Authority (hereinafter ‘the CMA’) as a case study.21 Seeing how the
CMA uses EU soft law would supplement research already conducted on the
Oana Stefan, Soft Law in Court: Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the European
Union (Kluwer Law International 2013), 179.
14
Ibid., 181.15
Zlatina Georgieva, ‘The judicial reception of competition soft law in the Netherlands and the
UK’ (2016), 12(1) European Competition Journal 54.
16
Zlatina Georgieva, ‘Competition Soft Law in French And German Courts: A Challenge for
Online Sales Bans Only?’ (2017) 24(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 175.
17
Lang (n 1), 1529.18
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 (hereinafter ‘Regu-
lation 1/2003’).
19
Stefan (n 14), 167ff; Case C-189/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri A/S v Commission of the European
Communities [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:408, para. 12.
20
The CMA is the National Competition Authority of the UK.21
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use of those instruments by UK courts22 as well as by other NCAs23 and would
contribute to vertical and horizontal comparisons in future research.
The purpose of this article is, therefore, to answer the question of how the
CMA in the United Kingdom uses EU competition soft law instruments in
deciding cases before it. In Section 2, the possibilities for the CMA to use soft
law on the basis of positivism or hybrid theories are established. Section 3 out-
lines the methodology used in the article. Section 4 briefly sets out the legal
framework for how the CMA should engage with soft law under UK and EU
law. In Section 5, the empirical findings are presented, followed by an analysis
in Section 6 of the general trends that were identified. Conclusions are provided
in Section 7.
2. Theoretical Framework
The aim of this article is to examine how the CMA uses EU
soft law instruments, where the term ‘to use’ encompasses different attitudes
the CMA can adopt towards EU soft law in its decisions. Following the theoret-
ical framework that Georgieva devised to categorise (non-) recognition of soft
law by UK courts, the hypothesis is that the CMA can either accept to recognise
soft law instruments or refuse their recognition.24
Decisions of the CMA that fall within the first category would confirm the
‘hybrid’ nature of the law, according to which soft law instruments are con-
sidered instruments ‘in their own right, [consciously designed with a view] to
complete and further detail the provisions of regulations or directives.’25 It
would mean that the CMA recognises the importance of new tools of governance,
such as the Commission’s policy-making powers, and competition soft law’s
role as a tool to ensure flexible governance and consistent enforcement of EU
law.26
Whether the hybridity theory is followed is, however, not binary. As Terpan
writes, there is a continuum of views that can be taken on the validity of soft
Georgieva (n 16).22
For instance, see: Axel Kallmayer, ‘Die Bindungswirkungen von Kommissionsmitteilungen
im EU-Wettbewerbsrecht – Mehr Rechtssicherheit durch Soft Law’, in: Christian Calliess (ed.),
23
Herausforderungen An Staat Und Verfassung: Völkerrecht – Europarecht – Menschenrechte (Nomos
2015), 662-682; Catherine Vincent, ‘La Force Normative des Communications et Lignes Dir-
ectrices en Droit Européen de la Concurrence’, in: Catherine Thibierge (ed.), La Force Normative
(Bruylant 2009), 691-457.
Zlatina Georgieva, ‘Soft Law in EU Competition Law and Its Judicial Reception in Member
States: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2015), 16(2) German Law Journal 223, 259
24
Stefan (n 14), 229.25
David Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, ‘The “Modernization” of European Community Competition
Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement: Part 1’ (2006), 27 European Competition Law Review
10, 15.
26
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law.27 Hence, following Georgieva’s framework, CMA decisions can be further
subdivided into those where the CMA agrees with an instrument explicitly,
thereby expressing its acceptance of the instrument. Alternatively, the CMA
can agree with an instrument implicitly if it was persuaded by the content of
soft law but chose not to make in-text references. The latter sub-category follows
the ‘persuaded judiciary’ theory, which was also hypothesised in Georgieva’s
study.28
CMA decisions that fall within the second category would, on the other
hand, confirm a formalistic view on the law, i.e. soft law instruments do not
have legally binding force and can therefore be disregarded completely. Refusal
of recognition can be expressed, for instance, when the authority explicitly
mentions a soft law instrument but refuses to give it any practical or legal effects
and omits it from further analysis.
Alternatively, refusal can be expressed by implicitly rejecting soft law, leading
to ‘neglect’. For instance, this can be the case when an undertaking under in-
vestigation uses soft law in an argument in its Statement of Objections, but the
CMA ignores the soft law entirely.
3. Methodology
When referring to the UK competition authority in general,
the term ‘CMA’ is used and should be viewed as including its predecessor, the
Office of Fair Trading (hereinafter ‘OFT’).29 To test the adherence of the CMA
to either of the abovementioned theories, the framework is used to categorise
references to soft law made in CMA decisions from May 2004 to December
2017. Decisions of the OFT will be used for the period of May 2004 to March
2014 because it carried out the CMA’s functions under the Competition Act
1998 (hereinafter ‘CA 98’) in enforcing EU competition law prior to the intro-
duction of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. Only decisions from
May 2004 onwards are analysed since that is when the decentralisation Regu-
lation 1/2003 became applicable.30 Moreover, only those OFT and CMA decisions
closed under the CA 98 are considered, which led either to an infringement of
Chapters I or II of CA 98, or which led to ‘no grounds for action’ decisions.31
Fabien Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union – The Changing Nature of EU Law’ (2014)
21(1) European Law Journal 68, 70.
27
Georgieva (n 16), 57.28
Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, OUP 2015), 63f.29
Regulation 1/2003, Art 45.30
Two remarks are necessary: (1) it should be noted that this excludes sectoral regulators that
also have the power to find infringements of CA 98; (2) only decisions with one of the three
31
outcomes are considered in this article, since other possible outcomes include ‘commitments’
and ‘administrative priorities’, in which the CMA does not engage with the substance of any
particular cases.
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This article only addresses decisions that contain at least one of the following
five Commission-issued soft law instruments. The first four are the Vertical
Guidelines,32 Horizontal Guidelines,33 101(3) Guidelines34 and the Guidance
Paper.35 As Georgieva writes, those are the four most referred to substantive
soft law instruments in the field of competition law,36 which are hence well-fit
for examining the CMA’s use of EU soft law in general. In addition, the Fine
Imposition Guidelines,37 a procedural soft law instrument,38 is included in the
scope of this article in order to establish whether the CMA uses substantive
soft law instruments differently from procedural ones.
To compile and analyse the relevant decisions, they were first located on the
website of the UK Government where all decisions are summarised and original
full versions published.39 An incurred constraint was that confidential decisions
are not published on the database. Any findings should have regard to this;
however, there is no reason suggesting that the CMA would use soft law differ-
ently in its confidential decisions. The OFT decision database in the National
Archives was used for finding decisions of the OFT40 and the terms inserted
European Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C130/01; When analysing
decisions closed prior to 2010, the older version of the Guidelines is used: Commission Notice
– Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ C291/01.
32
European Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/01.
33
European Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ
C101/97.
34
Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement prior-
ities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant un-
dertakings [2009] OJ C45/7.
35
Georgieva (n 16), 61.36
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation
No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C210/2.
37
The difference lies in that the Fine Imposition Guidelines are considered ‘application’ soft law.
This is different from ‘scope’ soft law instruments and has not yet been dealt with by the CJEU.
For more, see: Georgieva (n 16), ft 31.
38
UK Government website, Competition and Markets Authority case database,39
https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases, accessed on 3 December 2017. Since only those decisions issued
under the CA 98 were required, the cases were filtered by ‘CA98 and civil cartels’. However,
since the database search tool did not function with regard to advanced search syntax needed
for the purpose of the study, the website-specific search function on https://www.google.co.uk/
was used. This was done by adding the following to the search bar: <site:https://assets.publish-
ing.service.gov.uk/media/ “Competition Act 1998” AND “Decision of the”>. The latter two
phrases were added in order to filter the decisions by only the ones issued under the CA 98.
Office of Fair Trading case database (archived),40
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402160917/http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFT-
work/competition-act-and-cartels/ca98/decisions/, accessed on 3 December 2017. As with the
search for CMA decisions, https://www.google.co.uk/. was used. The following was inserted
into the search bar: <site:http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk “Competition Act 1998”
AND “Decision of the”>.
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into the search engines coincided with the formal and shortened41 titles of the
respective soft law instruments.
References falling under the ‘persuasion’ category of the framework were
determined based on a compilation of search terms that reflected the vocabulary
unique to the instruments in question.42 It is hypothesised that, if the CMA
adopts the same language as a particular soft law instrument does and reaches
a conclusion that is consistent with that instrument, it must have done so be-
cause of being persuaded by the instrument. However, it should be noted that
such a methodology is constrained by the text of the decisions and cannot derive
the particular thoughts of the CMA representative(s) choosing whether to accept
or reject soft law instruments.43
Finally, it was occasionally found that the CMA explicitly referred to the
same instrument repetitively whilst dealing with a single legal issue.44 For such
purposes, a ‘reference’ to soft law throughout CMA decisions is defined as a
mention of a particular instrument, either in-text or in footnotes, with regard
to a particular legal issue. Multiple repetitive references were, therefore, grouped
and counted as one. Additionally, generic references that did not apply soft law
to a legal issue (e.g. ‘The CMA will have regard to the Commission’s Article
101(3) Guidelines.’45) were not counted as ‘references’.
4. Legal Framework
In order to determine how the CMA uses EU soft law, there
is a presumption that it does so in accordance with the law – in so far as possible,
at least. This Section therefore presents the status quo of the law that shapes the
CMA’s duty to use EU soft law.
It is evident that, as an EU national administrative authority, the CMA must
apply EU law in accordance with Article 4(3) TEU. The duty was formed through
a body of case law decided by the CJEU in the 1980s and is now firmly estab-
lished as the duty of national courts and authorities to give full effect and con-
For example, ‘Vertical Guidelines’ or ‘Guidance Paper’.41
The following terms were searched for. Vertical Guidelines: ‘agency agreements’, ‘selective
distribution systems’, ‘upfront access payment’, ‘category management agreement’; 101(3)
42
Guidelines: ‘consumer pass-on’, ‘indispensability criterion’, ‘two-fold test’; Horizontal
Guidelines: ‘age of data’, ‘joint selling agreements’, ‘qualitative efficiencies’; Guidance Paper:
‘equally efficient competition’, ‘AAC’, ‘LRAIC’, ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’. For a more detailed
overview of the selection of terms, see: Georgieva (n 16), ft 39.
Interviews can be conducted with the CMA to ascertain references in which it implicitly accepted
or rejected soft law instruments.
43
For example, see: CMA Decision Conduct in the ophthalmology sector (2015) CE/9784-13, fts 759-
761.
44
CMA Decision Online sales of posters and frames (2016) 50223, para. 5.82.45
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sistent interpretation to EU law.46 This duty is even clearer for competition
authorities, as Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 introduces a cooperation obligation
on authorities and courts in the field of competition law. The Article’s domestic
counterpart is Section 60 of the CA 98, according to which UK courts and au-
thorities must ensure consistency of their decisions with EU law. This also ap-
plies to the CMA.47
The scope of this duty is, however, much less clear when EU soft law is
concerned. Several cases have been decided by the CJEU on the consistency
duty in case of EU soft law, but only with regard to national courts rather than
administrative authorities. The first case where the effects of a Commission-
issued Recommendation were discussed was the Grimaldi case about an Italian
worker in Belgium wishing to rely on a Commission Recommendation intro-
ducing a European schedule of occupational diseases which would have allowed
him to receive compensation for a disease he had. The Court held that ‘national
courts are bound to take recommendations into consideration in order to decide
disputes submitted to them,’48 and that instruments alike possess certain legal
effects. The interpretation of the duty to ‘take into consideration’ has proven
most difficult, even in the later judgements of the Court. In its 2016 Koninklijke
ruling, the Court, without even citing Grimaldi, seemingly reversed the duty
on national courts for using Commission Guidelines, stating that courts ‘may
depart’ from the interpretation given in a soft law instrument whenever such
departure is justified by the facts of the case.49 However, the ruling was likely
brought to such an extreme due to the sensitivity of the facts: the Commission
Recommendation in question conflicted with national hard law, and, had the
CJEU relied on the Grimaldi doctrine, national law would have been disregarded
by the Dutch court.50 Therefore, the duty of national courts is currently still far
from clear; the precise scope of the Grimaldi duty still remains to be seen.
The abovementioned case law should not be assumed to also apply to the
CMA for at least two reasons. Firstly, the CMA is not a national court and can
only be subjected to similar duties through general principles under EU law.51
Secondly, even if the case law does have an impact on the duties of national
administrative authorities, it is difficult to say whether the duties would remain
the same for the CMA, since none of the case law has dealt with soft law instru-
ments in the field of competition law.
Lang (n 2), 1489.46
Whish (n 29), 396.47
Grimaldi case (n 5), para. 18.48
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One of the few cases in which the CJEU dealt explicitly with the nature of
the obligations that NCAs have with regard to soft law is the 2012 Expedia case.52
In this case, the CJEU stated that NCAs ‘may take into account [Commission
Notices,] but [are] not required to do so.’53 This duty imposed on NCAs, if re-
garded as a duty at all, is significantly looser than the one imposed by the Court
in its Grimaldi case law. On the one hand, this could be because, in the Expedia
case, the instrument in question was the 2001 version of the de minimis Notice.54
The Notice was a ‘scope’ instrument that dealt with the market share thresholds
for determining when competitors appreciably restrict competition,55 rather
than with interpretation of the substantive content of Articles 101 and 102
TFEU.56 On the other hand, the CJEU stated that the Commission’s intention
with its Notices (not only de minimis) is to provide guidance to courts and au-
thorities in their application of the relevant provisions.57 It therefore seems, as
Stefan suggests, that the CJEU is certain that soft law does not have binding
legal effects on authorities.58 However, as the Court also admitted in its Pfleiderer
ruling, the Commission Guidelines, although aimed at merely clarifying the
Commission’s decision-making, ‘may have some effect on the practice of the
national competition authorities.’59 This focus on the practical effects of applying
soft law instruments is unclear and remains to be seen in future EU case law
and CMA decisional practice.
In national law, the CMA is bound by section 60(3) of the CA 98, which
states that ‘must (…) have regard to any relevant decision or statement of the
Commission.’ There, statements can be seen as soft law instruments issued by
the Commission60 but no explanation is given on the scope of the duty ‘to have
regard’ of such instruments.61 In the OFT’s MasterCard decision in 2005,62 it
has interpreted the duty as having ‘to give serious consideration’ to the Com-
mission’s statements. However, one can see that such an interpretation is sig-
nificantly stricter than the more recent one stemming from Expedia-like case
law. As will be seen in the following Section, the CMA has been using the looser
Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:795.52
Ibid., para. 31.53
Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict




Georgieva (n 16), ft 31.56
Expedia case (n 52), para. 28.57
Oana Stefan, ‘Relying on EU Soft Law Before National Competition Authorities: Hope for the
Best, Expect the Worst’ (2013) July 2013 (1) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 6.
58
Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] EU:C:2011:389, para. 23.59
Ibid.60
For an opinion on section 60, see: Shaun Goodman, ‘The Competition Act, section 60 – the
governing principles clause’ (1999), 20 European Competition Law Review 73.
61
OFT Decision MasterCard UK Members Forum Limited (2005) CA98/05/05, paras 107-116.62
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Expedia-based scope for interpreting section 60(3) in its decisions ever since
the case Expedia has been ruled.
To conclude, the above suggests that, strictly speaking, it is not legally
binding for the CMA to follow statements of the Commission.63 Nevertheless,
the language of the duty to ‘have regard’ to Commission soft law and the fact
that it is inscribed in national law make it more likely that soft law generates
practical effects in the CMA’s practice.
5. Empirical Findings
For a detailed account of the CMA’s attitude towards using
Commission soft law instruments, the overall data is first presented. This is
followed by an explanation of the references that fell within each of the categories
under the theoretical framework. An analysis of the trends found in CMA
practice with regard to EU soft law instruments will also be made.
5.1. Overview of Found Data
26 CMA decisions were found within the scope of the meth-
odology outlined above. Whenever decisions outside of this scope, but neverthe-
less relevant, are discussed throughout this article, they are referred to accord-
ingly. The proportion of decisions identified is high since the overall number
of decisions taken by the OFT or CMA under the Competition Act 1998 since
May 2004 until December 2017 is only 41.64 The proportion of decisions con-
taining references to soft law could be even higher, particularly because the
total includes confidential decisions.65 Hence, the data collection yielded that
at least 26 out of the 41 CMA decisions refer to one or more of the soft law in-
struments under consideration.
The collected decisions often contain a section on the ‘Application of section
60 of the Act – consistency with EU law,’66 in which the CMA establishes its
consistency obligation. Particularly, the CMA states that it must ‘under section
60(3) of the Act, (…) have regard to any relevant decision or statement of the
European Commission,’67 which is seen to include Commission Notices,
Goodman (n 61).63
31 decisions by the CMA or OFT were issued between May 2004 and June 2014, according to
Whish (n 29), 398-412; 10 decisions by the CMA were issued between June 2014 and December
2017, according to a search on the CMA database.
64
Summaries of confidential decisions are published on the CMA and OFT databases. For ex-
ample, see: CMA Decision Sports bras RPM investigation (2014) CE/9610-12, ht-
tps://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/sports-bras-rpm-investigation, accessed on 29 January 2018.
65
OFT Decision Distribution of Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles (trucks) (2013) CE/9161-09, 56.66
For example, see: OFT Decision Tobacco (2010) CE/2596-03, 37.67
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Guidelines and Communications.68 However, there are also decisions where
such a section is either omitted completely69 or only stated when the CMA
refers to a particular instrument.70 The CMA never elaborates on the meaning
of ‘having regard’. In addition, the mention of the section 60(3) consistency
obligation is, in most decisions, the only point where the CMA provides a
grounding for using soft law instruments throughout the decisions.
Another noteworthy observation about the section is that, since the CJEU’s
Expedia ruling, the case has increasingly been mentioned by the CMA in clari-
fying its section 60(3) obligation ‘to have regard’ to soft law.71 In particular, the
CMA refers to paragraph 31 of the Expedia ruling and states, e.g. in the Roma-
branded mobility scooters decision, that ‘the [CJEU] recently held that national
competition authorities “may take into account” guidance contained in non-
legally binding Commission Notices (specifically the [de minimis Notice]), but
such authorities are not obliged to do so.’72 It is interesting to note that the CMA
used the judgment to give a generally narrow scope to its section 60(3) obligation
considering that the Court in Expedia stressed that its analysis was only appli-
cable to ‘scope’ instruments such as the de minimis Notice. Moreover, none of
the collected decisions used the MasterCard interpretation of section 60(3) ‘to
give serious consideration’ to soft law. At first sight, this indicates that the CMA
is trying to distance itself from giving any form of legal or practical effects to
soft law instruments.
This should not, however, suggest that the CMA is reluctant to apply Com-
mission soft law in its decisions. On the contrary, from the dataset of 26 de-
cisions, the CMA made 80 references to soft law instruments. Firstly, the
number of references significantly exceeds the number of decisions because
in many of them the CMA cites more than one soft law instrument and each
instrument more than once. This is not surprising bearing in mind that the
length of the decisions collected can be up to 730 pages.73
The majority of the 80 references were made to the 101(3) Guidelines (32
references) and to the Vertical Guidelines (23 references). Significantly fewer
references were made to the Horizontal Guidelines (12 references) and the
Goodman (n 61), 5.68
CMA Decision Galvanised steel tanks for water storage information exchange infringement (2016)
CE/9691/12; No reference is made to section 60(3) at all, despite the CMA referring to the
Horizontal Guidelines later in the decision.
69
For example, see: OFT Decision Mobility scooters supplied by Pride Mobility Products Limited:
prohibition on online advertising of prices below Pride’s RRP (2014) CE/9578-12, para. 3.248: ‘In
70
interpreting the VABER, the OFT (and any court) must also have regard to statements of the
European Commission, including the Vertical Guidelines (see section 60(3) of the Act). In this
regard, the OFT notes that the Vertical Guidelines: (…).’
In 6 out 15 decisions since the Expedia ruling.71
OFT Decision Roma-branded mobility scooters: prohibitions on online sales and online price adver-
tising (2013) CE/9578-12, ft 282.
72
For example, see: Tobacco Decision (n 67).73
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Guidance Paper (11 references). Finally, the least references were made to the
Fine Imposition Guidelines (2 references).
In accordance with the theoretical framework, the collected references are
categorised in the forthcoming Sections, albeit with several necessary adapta-
tions.74 Overall, it is clear that in almost all (78 out of 80) of the references, the
CMA accepted soft law instruments and readily engaged with them in the
analyses of its decisions. Therefore, a preliminary look at the data already sug-
gests that the reception of the soft law instruments in CMA practice has been
largely positive.
The framework originally envisaged that if the CMA accepts a soft law in-
strument, it will do so either by explicitly referring to it or by using it implicitly.
However, throughout the data collection, the ‘explicit acceptance’ category was
split into two sub-categories. This is because in the collected decisions it was
recognised that the CMA can explicitly agree with an instrument to varying
extents.
Hence, the 76 instances where the CMA explicitly accepted soft law can be
split into two categories. First, 40 references where it did so while simultane-
ously relying on case law on which the instrument is based. It did so either by
first citing the CJEU case law on the matter and then referring to the relevant
instrument,75 or by amounting soft law instruments to summaries of the Court’s
case law.76 Second, 36 references were made to soft law instruments without
any mention of CJEU case law in connection with the soft law. The reasons for
the CMA doing so and the subsequent implications will subsequently be dis-
cussed.
Significantly fewer instances of implicit acceptance and of explicit/implicit
refusal have been identified in the decisions. Namely, in 2 references to the
101(3) Guidelines the CMA could have been persuaded by the Guidelines. An-
other reference that came close to implicit acceptance was to the Guidance Pa-
per.77 Lastly, the perhaps unsurprising finding was that the only refusals of the
CMA were with the Fine Imposition Guidelines, a procedural soft law instru-
ment. Out of the 2 references, one was explicitly made in Dairy retail price initi-
See Table 1.74
CMA Decision Conduct in the modelling sector (2016) CE/9859-14, ft 346: ‘Judgment in Com-
mission v Volkswagen AG, C-74/04P, ECR, EU:C:2006:460, paragraph 39; Commission Notice:
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 130, 19 May 2010, paragraph 25.’
75
CMA Decision Online resale price maintenance in the bathroom fittings sector (2016) CE/9857-14,
para. A.30: ‘The Commission’s Vertical Guidelines, summarising the relevant case law and
76
citing the judgments of the CJ, describe the two ways (which can be used jointly) to establish
acquiescence to a unilateral policy: (…).’
See Section 5.3.77
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16 7 – – – 23 
Horizontal 
Guidelines 
6 6 – – – 12 
Guidance Paper 5 6 – – – 11 
101(3) Guidelines 13 17 2 – – 32 
Imposition of 
Fines 
– – – 1 1 2 
Total 40 36 2 1 1 80 
Decisions collected: 26 
 
Table 1: Overview of references per instrument and per attitude.
5.2. Acceptance – Explicit Recognition of Soft Law
As was seen above, the attitude adopted by the CMA in 76 out
of 80 references was an ‘explicit acceptance’. Hence, each of the soft law instru-
ments in question, except for the Fine Imposition Guidelines, is generally ac-
cepted by the CMA in practice. Overall, the CMA made 40 references to soft
law in the ‘Explicit – with case law’ category. However, it made 36 of them in
the ‘Explicit – without case law’.
The need to sub-categorise cases of explicit acceptance of soft law instru-
ments becomes clear when one considers the nature of soft law issued by the
Commission. In accordance with Article 17(1) TEU, one reason for the Commis-
sion’s competence to issue soft law instruments is the necessity to provide
guidance on how an existing body of law should be interpreted and applied.80
For this reason, there are provisions in each of the instruments under consid-
eration regarding its relation to case law of the EU Courts.81 Thus, soft law in-
OFT Decision Dairy retail price initiatives (2011) CE/3094-03.78
Tobacco Decision (n 67).79
Whish (n 11), 50.80
Vertical Guidelines, para. 1(4); Horizontal Guidelines, para. 1.1.9; Guidance Paper, para. 3; 101(3)
Guidelines, para. 7.
81
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struments are essentially based on CJEU case law and are occasionally supple-
mented by the Commission’s own policies.82
Out of the collected references, the CMA’s acceptance with referral to EU
case law can happen in several different forms. An exemplary reference to the
Vertical Guidelines in such a situation can be seen in the Online resale price
maintenance in the bathroom fittings sector decision,83 where the CMA dealt with
methods for establishing unilateral policies in cases of vertical agreements.
There, the Authority clearly stated that the ‘Commission’s Vertical Guidelines,
summarising the relevant case law and citing the judgments of the [CJEU] de-
scribe the two ways (which can be used jointly) to establish acquiescence to a
unilateral policy: (…).’84
Alternatively, decisions were also found wherein the CMA simply referred
to soft law instruments and relevant case law on which they are based alongside
each other. For instance, in the Pride Mobility Products decision, the CMA,
dealing with a similar acquiescence issue, stated that ‘the Commission's
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (…), citing the judgment of the [CJEU] in
Commission v Volkswagen AG and the judgment of the GC in Bayer AG v
Commission, summarise the two ways (which can be used jointly) to establish
acquiescence to a unilateral policy: (…).’85
In both of the above decisions, the CMA refers to the Vertical Guidelines
and elaborates on the substance of the instruments, which is then followed to
solve the issue addressed in the decision. Therefore, it can be said that the
CMA’s attitude amounts to explicit acceptance of the Vertical Guidelines. This
can also be seen from its other references to the Vertical Guidelines, amongst
others.
This attitude to soft law is recognisable from the ‘case-law-read-together-
with-soft-law’ approach, which Georgieva also determined to be commonplace
in her study on soft law use in UK courts.86 This should not be surprising
considering that EU case law must be adhered to by the CMA in accordance
with sections 60(1)-(2) of the CA 98, which require it to ensure consistency of
application of EU hard law. In addition, in light of the CMA’s utilisation of the
‘Applicable Law’ section in its decisions, it seems that the primary way for the
CMA to justify its references to soft law stems from their usefulness in dealing
with EU hard law – in this case, EU case law.
Linda A. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law. Its Relationship to Legislation (diss.,
Wolf Legal Publishers 2004), 160; See also: Georgieva (n 24), 226f.
82
Online resale price maintenance in the bathroom fittings sector Decision (n 76), para. A.30.83
Ibid.; See also: OFT Decision Construction Recruitment Forum (2009) CE/7510-06, para. 3.74:
‘Agreements or concerted practices that prevent, restrict or distort competition by object are
84
those that, by their very nature, have the potential to do so. This principle has been confirmed
by the ECJ in a number of cases.’
Pride Mobility Products (n 70), A.34.85
Georgieva (n 16), 66f.86
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A justification based solely on the section 60(3) consistency obligation
without referring to case law in parallel can be seen in the second sub-category
of references. In the Galvanised steel tanks decision, for example, the CMA applied
the Horizontal Guidelines when establishing whether an information exchange
had restrictive effects on competition.87 There, the Parties, in their Statements
of Objection, argued on the basis of the Guidelines that their information ex-
change did not have any effects on fair competition.88 The CMA subsequently
relied specifically on the Horizontal Guidelines to prove that, since the informa-
tion exchange restricted competition by object in the first place, no consideration
of factors related to effects on competition was necessary.89 In this case, the
CMA openly engaged with the content of the Horizontal Guidelines, and such
references were categorised as ‘explicit – without case law.’ Such a form of ex-
plicit acceptance is an even stronger recognition of the relevant soft law instru-
ment, as the CMA feels a lesser need to justify its reliance through the use of
EU case law.
The ‘explicit – without case law’ category of CMA references, however, does
not appear to contradict the contention that the Authority strives to justify its
reliance on soft law through EU case law. This is because in decisions such as
Galvanised steel tanks, the soft law paragraphs to which the CMA refers are ulti-
mately based on EU case law,90 rather than on novel content introduced by the
Commission.
The last type of ‘Explicit Acceptance’ references worth mentioning is those
regarding the Commission’s Guidance Paper. It is widely acknowledged that
the Guidance Paper has played a less active role in soft law’s reception in
Member States, since it is a document aimed at, together with summarising
previous case law, outlining the Commission’s enforcement priorities with re-
gard to Article 102 abusive conduct.91 As a result, numerous parts of the Guid-
Galvanised steel tanks Decision (n 69).87
Ibid., ft 370: ‘Balmoral refers to paragraphs 86 to 94 of the Commission’s guidelines on the
applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ (2011) C11/1. These
88
paragraphs list various factors which are relevant in assessing the likely restrictive effect of an
information exchange on competition. However, as noted at paragraph 4.36 above, in the case
of a restriction of competition by object, it is not necessary to consider its effect on competition.
Paragraph 74 of the Commission’s horizontal co-operation guidelines state that ‘information
exchanges between competitors of individualised data regarding intended future prices or
quantities should therefore be considered a restriction of competition by object. In addition,
private exchanges between competitors of their individualised intentions regarding future
prices or quantities would normally be considered and fined as cartels because they generally
have the object of fixing prices or quantities.’
Ibid.89
Horizontal Guidelines, paras 86-94.90
Guidance Paper, para. 3.91
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ance Paper significantly deviate from EU case law and practice.92 As Georgieva
notes in her study on UK courts, it likely explains the poorer reception of the
Guidance Paper in national practice. This can evidently be seen from the lower
number of references made by the CMA to the document (11) compared to those
made to other Guidelines.
For instance, in the Flybe Limited decision, one of the issues the CMA dealt
with was whether Flybe’s abusive conduct could be objectively justified.93 Ob-
jective justifications are rooted in EU case law, recognising the reality that some
conduct, although formally abusive, can be justified.94 However, in paragraph
30 of the Guidance Paper, the Commission further introduces that conduct can
be objectively justified if the party can prove that its conduct produces efficiencies
outweighing any anti-competitive effects. This is not based on any EU case law
and is precisely the paragraph that the CMA refers to in the decision, according
to which, ‘in examining any claims that the conduct is justified by efficiencies,
the European Commission's guidance sets out the cumulative conditions that
a dominant undertaking will generally be expected to demonstrate, with a suf-
ficient degree of probability, and on the basis of verifiable evidence, that it has
met.’95 Similarly, references have been made in the same decision to paragraph
26 of the document with regard to the use of average avoidable cost (hereinafter
‘AAC’) price setting.96 In other decisions, the CMA similarly based its analysis
on paragraphs 28-31 of the Guidance Paper, which establish the efficiency doc-
trine as an objective justification.97
In spite of the above, references to the other Guidance Paper’s paragraphs
have been based on EU case law through either of the ‘explicit acceptance’ cat-
egories.98 Hence, although the CMA’s justification for relying on soft law in-
struments in its decisions is mostly based on case law, this is not so in all of its
decisions. Inconsistencies, potentially caused by CMA’s discretion with issues
such as AAC and efficiencies justifications, therefore still remain.
Richard Whish, ‘National competition law goals and the Commission’s Guidance on Article
82 EC: the UK experience’, in: Lorenzo Federico Pace (ed.), European Competition Law: The
Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 (Edward Elgar 2011), 159ff.
92
OFT Decision Alleged abuse of a dominant position by Flybe Limited (2010) MPINF-PSWA001.93
Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v Commission of the European Communities [1999] EU:T:1999:246.94
Flybe Limited Decision (n 93), para. 6.101.95
Whish (n 92), 158; Flybe Limited Decision (n 93), ft 236.96
OFT Decision Abuse of a dominant position by Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) Limited and
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc (2011) CE/8931/08, para. 3.50.
97
E.g.: CMA Decision Unfair pricing in respect of the supply of phenytoin sodium capsules in the UK
(2016) CE/9742-13, ft 774.
98
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5.3. Acceptance – Implicit Recognition of Soft Law
Two references were identified in which the CMA implicitly
accepted the 101(3) Guidelines and thereby followed the ‘persuaded judiciary’
theory introduced earlier. Additionally, a decision in which the CMA came close
to an implicit reference is discussed.
The first reference deals with the 101(3) Guidelines in the CMA’s Tobacco
decision. In paragraph 7.51, the Authority stated the following: ‘the case law of
the European Court makes clear that an agreement or concerted practice only
meets the exemption conditions if it is demonstrated that it is more likely than
not that the agreement or concerted practice must make it possible to obtain
appreciable objective advantages of such a character as to compensate for the
disadvantages for competition caused by the agreement or concerted practice.’99
It then refers to the Consten and Grundig case, which laid the basis for objective
advantages to consumers as a condition for the exemption criteria under Article
101(3) TFEU.100 However, it is unclear why, in this regard, the CMA did not
engage with the 101(3) Guidelines which define the same concept as ‘the net
effect of the agreement must at least be neutral from the point of view of those
consumers directly or likely affected by the agreement [, and that,] if such con-
sumers are worse off following the agreement, the second condition of Article
81(3) is not fulfilled.’101 In this paragraph, the Commission also refers to the
Consten and Grundig case,102 raising the question of why the CMA chose not to
follow the Guidelines and instead directly relied on case law.
The second reference, also in the Tobacco decision to the same guidelines,
was that ‘the [CJEU] stated in its recent T-Mobile Netherlands judgment that
agreements or concerted practices which have as their object the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition are those which can be regarded, “by
their very nature”, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal
competition.’103 The same explanation that restrictions by object are harmful
for competition is clearly stated in paragraph 21 of the 101(3) Guidelines.
Since the CMA similarly avoids the 101(3) Guidelines in both references and
relies directly on case law, its outcome was the same as it would have been if it
had applied the Guidelines. This is not surprising if one considers case law as
the basis of the Guidelines. The references therefore seem to amount to an
implicit acceptance of the Guideline’s content by the CMA.
Tobacco Decision (n 67), para. 7.51.99
Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Com-
mission of the European Economic Community [1966] ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, paras 347-348.
100
101(3) Guidelines, para. 85.101
Ibid., ft 80.102
Tobacco Decision (n 67), para. 3.41.103
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Another reference that could, at first sight, be categorised as an implicit ac-
ceptance was made in the Cardiff Bus decision.104 In paragraphs 7.156-7.158, the
CMA stated that it will use the AAC as a standard for determining abusive sale
prices. It must be noted that the CJEU had indeed mentioned in its AKZO
ruling that sale prices higher than average variable costs (AVC) but below average
total cost (ATC) would be considered abusive.105 However, in the Commission’s
Guidance Paper, it is suggested that the AAC standard, which most often leads
to similar results, is also most likely to be used by the Commission.106 This
suggestion that the AAC method is economically advantageous is – although
not contradictory – inconsistent with prior CJEU case law.107 Moreover, it must
be noted that at the point when the Cardiff Bus decision was issued in 2008,
the Guidance Paper was not yet available; instead, DG Competition’s Discussion
Paper was published,108 the substance of which was almost identical to the Pa-
per.109 Thus, since no EU case law was available in 2008, the ‘AAC’ terminology
could have come from the Discussion Paper and thereby influenced the CMA.
It could have been so due to the document’s status as a Discussion Paper and
its formal value at the time.
However, by 2008, the CMA had already used the AAC standard in some
of its previous decisions, such as Aberdeen Journals,110 as the Authority noted in
paragraph 7.156 thereof. It is more likely, however, that the CMA merely used
its discretion to follow the AAC methodology for appropriate price setting and,
hence, did not actually rely on the Discussion Paper in the decision. Neverthe-
less, after the publication of the Guidance Paper in 2009, the CMA immediately
began citing the Paper, suggesting that it felt more convenient to justify the
AAC method by relying on the Paper, rather than by continuing to refer to its
own practices. Since the CMA was not persuaded by the Paper, this cannot,
therefore, be categorised as an implicit acceptance.
5.4. Explicit and Implicit Refusal for Recognition of Soft Law
The only instrument found to be rejected by the CMA was the
Commission’s Fine Imposition Guidelines. Its negative attitude to the
Guidelines can also be inferred from the low number of references (2).
OFT Decision, Abuse of a dominant position by Cardiff Bus (2008) CE/5281/04, paras 7.156-7.158.104
Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v EC Commission [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para. 60.105
Guidance Paper, para. 26; Pιnar Akman, ‘The European Commission’s guidance on article
102 TFEU: from inferno to paradiso?’ (2010) 73(4) Modern Law Review 605, 618ff.
106
Ibid.107
Commission, ‘DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty
to exclusionary abuses’ (2005); For the AAC standard, see paras 108-110 thereof.
108
Whish (n 92), 154ff.109
OFT Decision Aberdeen Journals Ltd: alleged abuse of a dominant position (2003) CA98/14/2002.110
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The decision in which an explicit refusal was identified was in Dairy Retail.111
As with other decisions, it starts out with several paragraphs on the consistency
obligation and that the it must have regard to Commission-issued soft law.112
When the CMA considered the method of calculating penalties to be imposed
on the Parties, it stated that: ‘(…) although the OFT’s approach [to calculating
the appropriate amount of fines] will be broadly consistent with the general
principles applied by the Commission – such as the need to sanction the under-
takings concerned and deter other undertakings as per the preamble to the
Commission's guidelines – the OFT is not bound to adopt, in relation to the detail,
the same methodology as the Commission, particularly where the Commission
has itself a wide margin of discretion under its own guidelines. That would be
tantamount to arguing that the OFT should apply the Commission's guidelines.
Moreover, the OFT's duty under section 60(3) is at most only to have regard to
any relevant decision or statement of the Commission.’113
In this paragraph the CMA states that it would not apply the same method-
ology as the Commission to the calculation of fines in the case. Since the
Commission’s methodology is equal, in essence, to the principles that guide it
when setting fines, it can be said that the Fine Imposition Guidelines represent
the Commission’s methodology.114 The CMA further states that it will only be
bound by the general principles that also guide the Commission, but not the
more detailed Guidelines themselves. Furthermore, in the following sentence
the CMA stresses that section 60(3) only imposes a loose duty on it ‘to have
regard’ to the Guidelines, thereby distancing itself from engaging with them.
Although the CMA does rely on the Guidelines’ preamble to express its agree-
ment with general principles, it can be concluded that the Authority does not
engage with the substance of the Guidelines at all. Hence, this is an instance
of explicit refusal of the soft law instrument within the theoretical framework.
In addition, paragraph 7.8 states the following: ‘The OFT does not consider
that it is required by section 60 of the Act to calculate the penalties it imposes
under the Act in the same manner as penalties imposed by the Commission
(…) The OFT’s primary obligation when calculating penalties under the [CA
98] is, therefore, to have regard to its [own] Penalty Guidance. Moreover, to the
extent that that produces a different result from that which would arise from
the approach adopted by the Commission, the OFT considers that such an
outcome would be the consequence of a “relevant difference” between the
provisions concerned under section 60(1) of the Act.’115 It can be argued that
although at first sight the explicit rejection of the Guidelines would mean that
Dairy retail price initiatives Decision (n 78).111
Ibid., para. 3.4.112
Ibid., para. 7.9.113
Fine Imposition Guidelines, para. 8.114
Dairy retail price initiatives Decision (n 78), para. 7.8.115
67Review of European Administrative Law 2018-1
EU SOFT LAW IN THE HANDS OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
the instrument has no effects at all, from this paragraph it can be seen how the
CMA follows the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach, pursuant to which each party
can choose to either (a) conform to a soft law instrument or (b) deviate from it
and explicitly state reasons for deviation from the instrument.116 In accordance
with this principle, the CMA does not proceed with applying its own Penalty
Guidelines whilst disregarding the Commission Guidelines, but rather chooses
to first explain the legal basis for its refusal, basing it instead on section 60(1)
of CA 98.117
The second decision in which a refusal of the Fine Imposition Guidelines
was found was the Tobacco decision. Here, the issue the CMA had to deal with
was identical to the one it dealt with in Dairy Retail; in fact, even the analysis
and wording used by the Authority were identical.118 The only relevant difference
was that, firstly, the two Parties were the first ones to rely on the Commission’s
Guidelines to determine the steps for calculating the fines;119 secondly,
throughout the entire decision, the CMA only referred to the instrument as ‘the
Commission’s guidance’, and never properly referenced the Guidelines as it
does with other soft law instruments.120 This must be interpreted as the CMA
distancing itself even further from the Guidelines. Hence, according to the
applied theoretical framework, this reference is categorised as an ‘implicit re-
fusal’ of the Guidelines.
6. Analysis of Trends
Three important observations can be made from the above
categorisation of the CMA’s attitudes towards soft law instruments.
6.1. The Likelihood of the CMA’s Acceptance of Soft Law
The overall attitude of the CMA is positive towards the Vertical
Guidelines, 101(3) Guidelines, Horizontal Guidelines and the Guidance Paper,
i.e. the CMA has referred to the instruments in most of its decisions. The justi-
Zlatina Georgieva, ‘EU Competition Soft Law, National Courts and Multi-Level Enforcement:
Certainty and Consistency Secured?’ (on file with author), 21f; Emilia Korkea-Aho, ‘EU soft
116
law in domestic legal systems: flexibility and diversity guaranteed?’ (2009), 16(3) Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law 271 and 281.
Dairy retail price initiatives Decision (n 78), ft 1124: ‘See comments in Hansard at the time the
Competition Bill was being debated, such as the comment on behalf of the Government that
117
section 60 was intended to import "high level principles, such as proportionality, legal certainty
and administrative fairness" into domestic law’.
Tobacco Decision (n 67), paras 8.8-8.11.118
Ibid., para. 8.8.119
Ibid., para. 8.11.120
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fications made by the Authority for using soft law is important to note in this
regard. Firstly, in most decisions, a ‘Consistency with European Union law’
section is included. This allows the CMA to ground soft law early in each de-
cision to avoid explaining its reliance on soft law each time it refers to it later
in the judgment. This is consistent with the high number of subsequent refer-
ences the CMA makes per decision. Secondly, in the majority of references,
the CMA justified its reliance on soft law by either referring specifically to EU
case law alongside soft law itself or by stipulating that a soft law instrument is,
primarily, a summary of the relevant EU case law. In fact, in case of the former,
the soft law content that the CMA refers to is in the first place based on case
law. Therefore, it can already be said that the CMA is very likely to accept a soft
law instrument if it is based on EU case law.
On the other hand, the CMA also made references in which it accepted the
mentioned soft law where it was not based on any prior EU case law. This has
been the case with references made to novel parts of the Guidance Paper, which,
as Georgieva writes, were readily rejected by the courts in the UK.121 A number
of explanations can be given for this. Firstly, such acceptance was only found
in relation to 6 out of 11 references to the Guidance Paper. Moreover, references
to the Guidance Paper formed only 13% of the references. The number of refer-
ences to the Paper overall is low, meaning that, in other relevant decisions the
CMA abstained from referring to the Paper in the first place. Secondly, out of
those 6 references, the Authority could have merely used its discretion in inter-
preting Article 102 TFEU. It could have found solutions, such as the AAC fine
calculation method or efficiency justifications to be the best interpretation of
Article 102 and aimed to use it in any case, and therefore merely found it con-
venient to cite the approach in the Guidance Paper once it was published.
Hence, in general, the CMA is likelier to accept arguments based on soft
law as long as it is based on EU case law. Similarly, it is less likely to do so when
an instrument has no basis in case law. This is consistent with the practice
witnessed in EU courts.122
6.2. Referring to Case Law Versus Soft Law
The second observation is that an explanation is yet to be found
of the two ‘implicit acceptance’ references the CMA made to the 101(3) Guidelines
in its Tobacco decision. At first sight, its first reference to the T-Mobile case123
could be justified by the fact that the 101(3) Guidelines had been published in
Georgieva (n 16), 74f; For example, see: Purple Parking Ltd, Meteor Parking Ltd v Heathrow Airport
Ltd [2011] EWHC 987 (Ch).
121
Senden (n 82), 390.122
Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I- 04529, para. 29.
123
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2004, while the T-Mobile case was decided in 2009 and was therefore the most
recent when the CMA made its decision in 2010. Nevertheless, this does not
explain why the CMA did not engage with the 101(3) Guidelines in the other
reference, choosing rather to cite the Consten and Grundig case from 1966.
Although more instances of such implicit references are likely to exist
throughout the decisions, the discussion regarding the reasons behind this
phenomenon are of small practical importance. This is because, as in the above
references, the soft law content is ultimately endorsed by bypassing the instru-
ment and relying on EU case law. Hence, it can be concluded that if a soft law
provision can also be found in case law, then the CMA will accept it, be it explic-
itly or implicitly.
6.3. Refusal of Recognition of the Fine Imposition Guidelines
It has been seen that, in principle, no instances of refusal have
been found with regard to the first four instruments.
The difference lies in the different nature of the instruments: the first four
of them can be categorised as those providing guidance on the interpretation
of substantive law, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Fine Imposition Guidelines,
on the contrary, aims at providing guidance on how penalties for fined under-
takings should be calculated. This makes the Guidelines relevant for defining
procedural law – a field that has not been harmonised under Regulation 1/2003
and EU law in general – which is applied on national level. Since the Commis-
sion and EU courts have less control over national procedural matters, the Fine
Imposition Guidelines are less persuasive to the CMA.124 Moreover, both Article
23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 as well as the preamble of the Guidelines state
that the aim of the Guidelines is merely to improve transparency in the Com-
mission’s activities, therefore being of less relevance for national authorities.125
To conclude, it is the procedural nature of the Guidelines and the wider discre-
tion of the CMA in setting fines that can lead to their rejection.
As it was mentioned above,126 the CMA nevertheless follows the ‘comply-
or-explain’ principle, even if there is no legal obligation on the Authority to do
so. Even though it is required under section 60(3) of the CA 98 to ‘have regard’
to the Commission’s soft law, this duty does not require it to follow the precise
approach suggested by the Commission. This approach seems correct, since
AG Kokott, in her Expedia opinion, also implies that a version of the ‘comply-
See a similar trend in State Aid: Michelle Cini, ‘The soft law approach: Commission rule-
making in the EU’s state aid regime’ (2001), 8(2) Journal of European Public Policy 192, 204ff.
124
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or-explain’ principle should exist when stating that NCAs ‘must give reasons
which can be judicially reviewed for any divergences’ either on a case-by-case
basis or by publishing a general enforcement notice.127 This means that rejection
in such form of the Guidelines can nevertheless be considered as having prac-
tical effects on parties.
7. Conclusion
The findings of this article allow for the conclusion that the
CMA’s use of EU soft law instruments is definitely not binary. On the one hand,
the legal framework of the national duties with regard to EU soft law is far from
clear, as it was seen in the CJEU’s Grimaldi and Expedia lines of case law. Hence,
little formal guidance has been provided to the CMA on the matter. On the
other hand, the practice of the CMA has been seen to be rather consistent, albeit
with exceptions. Several important conclusions have thus been established.
Although a precise delineation of soft law’s legal and practical effects would
be preferable for determining how the CMA uses soft law, such a delineation,
as important as it may be, is purely theoretical. Thus, it was this article’s purpose
to assess how soft law is used by the CMA and, consequently, serve as a clarific-
ation for undertakings that wish to rely on soft law instruments in practice. The
answer to the research question posed earlier is therefore three-fold. Firstly,
the CMA is very likely to engage with EU substantive soft law instruments,
provided they are in some way grounded in EU case law. Considering that most
provisions of the substantive soft law instruments under consideration are
based on EU case law, one can conclude that relying on such instruments is
‘safe’. Moreover, it has been seen that even if the CMA does not want to engage
with soft law, it will likely still do so implicitly through the case law on which
it is based. Secondly, the CMA will also likely accept the provisions of the
Guidance Paper that do not stem from case law, but which were introduced by
the Commission. This result is different from what has been found with respect
to the attitude of UK and Dutch courts, which seem more reluctant to accept
soft law in these circumstances.128 Thirdly, it is concluded that the CMA is likely
to refuse recognition of procedural soft law instruments such as the Fine Im-
position Guidelines. However, even in such a case it can be expected to justify
its refusal through a version of the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle.
Expedia case (n 52), Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 39 and ft 40; Georgieva (n 116), 21-22.127
See: Georgieva (n 16).128
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Such an attitude of the CMA suggests that it considers the law to go beyond
formal legislation, and therefore follows the hybridity theory in its decisions.129
Although it has been seen from EU case law and national practice that legally
binding effects of soft law instruments do not exist, the practical effects of the
five soft law instruments have nevertheless been determined in the CMA’s
practice. This can be seen not only from the fact that the CMA itself is likely to
use EU soft law, but also from the instances in which parties have relied on
soft law arguments with which the CMA readily engaged.
Of course, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as well as from the EEA will
have a serious impact on the CMA’s practice, as it will result in the non-appli-
cation of EU law, including EU competition (soft) law, within the UK’s territory.
However, repealing the prohibitions under Chapters I and II of the CA 98 –
the provisions transposing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU – would seem radical
because they have been shaping UK’s competition law since it joined the EC.
Simply substituting Chapters I and II with new competition laws would therefore
cause unnecessary uncertainty.130 Instead, it seems likelier that the consistency
obligation under section 60 of the CA 98 will be modified.131 Thus, the CMA’s
engagement with EU soft law post-Brexit remains to be seen as it will ultimately
depend on the extent to which section 60 CA 98 will be modified.
Nevertheless, the findings of this article go beyond the role of EU soft law
in CMA practice. They also aim to somewhat ‘relax’ the debate on soft law in
the EU. With respect to NCAs and provided that the majority of EU soft law’s
substance amounts to a mere codification of pre-existing CJEU case law, its
ample use does not seem to increase the democratic deficit in any significant
way. This is so because such instruments do not introduce ‘new law’ by by-
passing democratic safeguards. Yet, one cannot exclude the possibility that the
Commission would codify an interpretation of CJEU case law favouring itself.
This might in turn result in NCAs opportunistically choosing to rely on either
the soft law instrument or case law that most favours their needs. Although
this does not seem to have happened in the case of the CMA’s decisions, this
might well be a concern in other Member States.
It can also be concluded that, on the contrary, soft law succeeds in clarifying
the often-complex bodies of ‘hard’ statutory and case law in fields as fast-paced
as competition law. In light of the present need for flexible and dynamic gov-
ernance, soft law might therefore be seen as a useful and ‘harmless’ tool. Further
David M. Trubek, M. Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, ‘“Soft law”, “hard law”, and EU Integration’,
in: Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott (eds.), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US
(Hart Publishing 2006), 65.
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research, however, should explore whether these findings can be generalised
beyond the peculiarities of competition law.
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